The present study analyses a key contemporary transformation in international law: the ascent of China and the decline of the hegemony of the United States.
Introduction
The present study examines a key contemporary transformation in international law: the rise of China and the decline of the hegemony of the United States. I shall construct a two-stage theoretical picture of China's mission to establish a regional order with Beijing at the centre. First, I articulate how international law's universal ideological structure services hegemonic interests and practice, and explore whether established ideology could be unsettled and rearticulated to reform the hegemony of the United States in China's periphery. Second, I enunciate that international law formalises diplomatic initiatives, designed to heighten economic, cultural, and political ties between China and its periphery ('the Beijing cosmology'). China's historical centrality produces an ambition at odds with its normative subordination under the U.S. led ensemble of social relations. China, for now, suppresses that ambition and operates within neoliberal structures.2 Neoliberalism is the common thread that links U.S. and Chinese approaches to international law. I unfold China's adoption of neoliberal relations of production, in light of Gramscian theories of hegemony as applied to international law. There is little meaningful treatment of the Sino-Western dichotomy in international legal scholarship, which is replete instead with superficial analysis of perceived Chinese ascendancy coloured by Western anxiety.3 Through the broad lens of international legal theory, it becomes apparent that frequently invoked Western anxiety-stereotyping China as an existential 'other'-is unfounded. From the perspective of Gramscian hegemony, China remains a secondary state, normatively. I shall demonstrate that Sino-U.S. relations are congenial: China's Dream of state recovery is conservative and neoliberal. China's material interests are realised not by counter-hegemony, but by perpetuating neoliberalism as the international public order's social logic. For international legal theory to properly assess the Sino-U.S. relationship, Chinese aspirations must be considered with China's own historical conditions in mind, not simply in terms of the U.S.'s telos. That is what the present study offers.
Section 2 explains international law's ideological capacity to procure state obedience and how hegemonic ideologies inform China's engagement with 85
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) horizontally socialises the transnational elite of secondary states10; and (2) a terrain on which ideological conflict manifests.
The aim of this section is two-fold: first, I explain how international legal ideology legitimates the essential subordination of secondary states under the global capitalist hierarchy; and second, I analyse the hegemonic class's capacity to coercively determine and enforce the political and legal structures that bind all, using international legal ideology.
The concept of ideology springs from the French Revolution: it comprises lived ideas and beliefs, coextensive with unified political conclusions.11 International legal ideology asserts universal expectations to evaluate the unique socio-economic practices of each state. The U.S. politically and economically reconstructed allies after WWII, with the UN Charter's enshrined juridical equality operating as an instrument of Anglo-American political violence.12 Since then, it continues to designate which issues warrant the technical resources and political energy of the international system.13 International legal ideology substitutes the systemic, institutionalised inequality between states, for abstract, formal equality. After 1945, international law's organisational structure-consisting of multilateral arrangements advancing themes of indivisibility and formal reciprocity-have gradually transposed the U.S.'s parochial interests onto the world.14 International law has been used to 10 In the present study, 'transnationalism' refers to the interactions, regulations, and events that transcend national geopolitical boundaries. It is a multidirectional phenomenon that stems from the interpenetration of capital, resources, and labour. 11 See also Andrew Halpin, 'Ideology and Law ' (2006) 11 Journal of Political Ideologies 153. Halpin's takes ideology as a tool to understand politics. Its existence presupposes a continuing controversy over the political and a need to justify a particular political arrangement over a competing view. This reading dovetails with the agnostic pluralism of Mouffe, which holds that political opposition is incapable of final reconciliation. 12 The U.S.'s role as the global creditor of the capitalist world-economy secured its hegemonic status. Wilson compellingly argues that it is tempting to interpret the development of multilateralism and international organisations as a collective effort-by the U.K. and the U. 
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) 81-121 justify export of (low intensity) neoliberal structures for democratic transition. Purveyors of the 'rule of law' assumed an imperialist duty to 'help' those abroad attain prosperity through romanticised doctrine, imposing foreign 'law' to further subjugate a conquered people.15 China's normative rise occurs in this context. My argument progresses in three stages. First, I challenge international legal ideology's legitimacy. International legal ideology mystifies the structural inequalities of a given historical moment to condition a senso commune. A popular consciousness universalised in social and economic life, the senso commune allows the hegemon to express a singular conception of law and politics for all.16 This argument requires that I elucidate the hegemon-subordinate relationship. By the subordinate, I mean the transnational leaders of secondary states, co-opted into an internationalised, hierarchical division of labour. Such elites, tantamount to an interstate bourgeoisie, calibrate their substantive beliefs, value orientations, and political interests to correspond with those of hegemonic control. This occurs through: (1) frequent participation in transnational institutions designed by the hegemon;17 (2) normative persuasion from hegemonic narratives prevalent in diplomacy, cultural exchange, and international study; and (3) a desire to justify policy decisions within the normative orientation of the hegemonic system for domestic legitimacy and material interest.18 For normative claims about the international public order to affect state behaviour, they must bind the elite community (not necessarily the masses) into a single class with a common socio-economic worldview. The elites's acceptance of hegemonic normativity corresponds to their integrated position in the world-economy. They tacitly support the 'legality' of U.S. hegemony, inextricably linked with the U.S. ' 
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) 81-121 socialisation, embedded in state behaviour, grounds the domestic legitimacy of the subordinate in the faithful implementation of the neoliberal program. Hegemonic rule, based on right, enhances rule, based on might. The neoliberal model is internationalised through conquering the hearts and minds of the subordinate, implicitly backed by the hegemon's superior political capacity to uphold legal claims.20
Ideologies are not unilateralist: rather, they genuinely reward subordinate interests. Ideology indicates the effectiveness of hegemonic influence.21 The hegemon institutes intellectual and 'moral' reform to elicit subordinate 'consent' , legitimate its leadership, and forge an ideological unity by containing disparate wills. The hegemon fashions a plausible account of social reality acceptable to the subordinate, by which the subordinate internalises the international public order's hierarchical regime as norm. An international rule of law constitutes an eminent hegemonic socialisation strategy: it takes root in elite politics, allowing subordinates to legally structure coalitions for expedient self-interest. The subordinate acquiesces to the 'consensual' normative order when it repeatedly: (1) implements policy goals which correspond to hegemonic values, derived from 'cooperation' with legitimated leadership; and (2) accepts the foreign vocabulary of international law as the instrument through which the hegemon pronounces the prevailing account of contemporary reality.
The second stage of my argument posits that regardless of its illegitimacy, international legal ideology is efficacious. It articulates a clear blueprint of the normative order for the observance of secondary states.22 In a two-stage process, first coercion and then discipline transform state behaviour. The hegemon deploys force, initially, to intervene directly in a secondary state's domestic political institutions, and adapt the masses to a radical change in economic structures.23 International legal ideology then intervenes, as the repressive aspect of the primary moment. It assists the subordinate to rationalise the erasure of previous social and economic behaviour. And, to 'freely' accept new economic structures functional to hegemonic continuation, as their own.24 Ideology secures the hegemon's material and intellectual leadership. International law stands as a secondary moment of self-regulation 20 and self-discipline structured according to the singular universal of the hegemon. Third, I explore whether international legal ideology could nevertheless be a vehicle for emancipatory change, beyond mere defensive resistance. The views of opposing political regimes are irremediable; power and resistance are perpetually interlinked.25 International law is precisely a terrain for battles of ideological attrition, not of violent revolution. A constant disarticulation and rearticulation of the hegemonic principle sees multiple political forms attempting to unsettle hegemony.
Organicist populism accentuates the contradiction between ideals of justice, equality, and freedom on one side, and the disappointments of neoliberalism, on the other.26 International rules appear as lifeless abstraction in the face of political motivations (backed by coercion) that determine international law's normative content. Before I address these issues, let me outline the normative order in China's periphery.
2.1
China's Imperialist Encirclement I begin with Marx, who first channelled ideology to analyse social relations. For Marx, the ruling class conceives of a suite of beliefs, expedient to its social and economic interests, as the true belief for the common interest of all society.27 Legal and political institutions-the dominant violence in society-represent epiphenomena that secure class domination by masking inequality in labour market exploitation. International legal ideology is reduced to false consciousness that elicits the subordinate's countenance of class domination. Ideology has no history of its own. And, a fortiori, its reality is manufactured.
Ideology does not simply cloak manipulation of material conditions. A hegemonic order encompasses a level of subordinate independence: the hegemon secures subordinate compliance through ideological persuasion.28 International legal ideology, the juridical structure that embodies normative principles of the international public order, socialises elites into a transnational community. These elites enact state policies that correspond with 25 Weber and Rheinstein (n 2); Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power ' (1982) The U.S., post-1945, exported liberal multilateralism as the universally legitimate political framework. The Marshall Plan catalysed Western Europe's economic revival and political realignment to a liberalised order founded on capitalist principles.30 The U.S. initiated currency reform, trade liberalisation, and instilled a belief in the European policy elite that instead of imperialist empire, U.S. loans paved a most effective path to world stability. A large-scale injection of resources and capital integrated the region (beginning with the elite) into a common, U.S.-designed socio-economic order.31 The U.S. also directly intervened to internally reconstruct Japanese political structures, leading to changes in Japanese foreign policy congenial to neoliberalism.32 Economic growth from U.S. intervention ensured the increasing appeal of a neoliberal normative consensus. Put differently, the U.S.'s post-war strategy inspired subjective aspirations towards liberal multilateralism in European and Japanese elites. This validated the objective social circumstances of economic restoration and conferred legitimacy on U.S. hegemony. The elites's subjective allegiances, and society's objective structures, mutually reinforced one another,33 transmitting the social logic of U.S. hegemony into state behaviour and denying other possibilities.
Since the 1960s, the U.S. has practiced interventionist unification, in a world of divergent political structures and heterogeneous cultural roots.34 29 (1) maintaining a relatively open market for distressed goods-or, financing free trade by adapting domestic resources to changes in productive capacities abroad; (2) upholding a stable system of floating exchange rates; (3) guaranteeing counter-cyclical (long-term) lending to stabilise domestic investment and stimulate exports; (4) coordinating domestic macroeconomic policies by conferring strategic and financial opportunities to reward openness to the world market; and (5) act as a lender of last resort to underwrite the flow of investment capital and imports. 37 As Section 2.1 described, agrarian practices generated social camaraderie and corresponding expectations unlike those of a mechanised Westphalian state. overlooked is the imperialist history that colours Sino-Russian relations: China ceded 'Outer Manchuria' to Soviet control in the 19th century. For China, these external geopolitical challenges coincide with pressing separatist movements in Mongolia, Xizang, Xinjiang, and most recently, Hong Kong.45 I shall proceed to elucidate the first strand of my analysis: international legal ideology's compatibility with U.S. hegemony. China's increased willingness to contest U.S. hegemony correlates with reclaiming Sino-centrality. But a new balance in international law cannot be achieved merely by China's engagement in hegemonic contestation. Drawing upon Gramsci and his interlocutors, I explain that international law institutes ideological control and justifies a leadership class's normative authority over subordinates.46 Gramscian hegemony was initially sketched as a national phenomenon to explain relations between the bourgeoisie and subaltern. It informs, however, a richer understanding of international legal ideology, as a means: (1) to mask the material advantages of the dominant class; (2) to produce social subjectivity; and (3) as a relational instrument for the subordinate to define its interstate existence.
International legal ideology may ultimately constrain Chinese political ambition. Its rhetoric normalises hegemonic leadership of the interstate social system.47 But, as the following subsections argue, international legal ideology organises effective social action and encourages both leaders and subordinates to subjectively identify with a contingent hierarchical order.
2.1.1
International Legal Ideology: A Mystifying Force for Hegemony Juridical equality demands that sovereigns, as subjects in political relations, exert coercive violence to determine the content of international legal relationships. Under an epoch of capitalism, it is impossible to evenly distribute benefits and losses; the abundance of some disenfranchises others.48 Normatively subordinated states are unable to substantively challenge the hegemon.
The orthodox Marxist contends that the bourgeoisie wield coercive bureaucratic apparatuses, including law, to manipulate the working class. This contention reduces ideology into malleable epiphonema (not dissimilar to realist interpretations of international law). Under orthodox Marxism, ideology is superstructure that simply reflects coercive authority, upholding self-interested commodity exchanges generated by dominant modes of production.49 The hegemonic class, through the punitive function of the state, suppresses the interests of the base. But this class domination brews passive revolution and is exceedingly resource intensive. It inevitably triggers the coercion of law when interests that reflect popular will can no longer be absorbed by a monolithic hegemonic class. The law's consensual function-to cement social conformism under the hegemonic class's leadership-ruptures. The hegemon must then use coercion to repress the masses.50 Therefore, hegemony based on fraud is unsustainable. Orthodox Marxism fails to recognise that effectual law must be more than coercive-it must have an ideological function.
International legal ideology provides ordering principles for hegemony in two ways. First, it propagates a common culture complementary to objectified social structures, and homogenises the expectations and behaviours of subordinates.51 Hegemony endows an outcome of human endeavour, international law, with independent, institutional life for the subordinate's worship.52
Second, international legal ideology normalises the interstate imbalance of power and feigns neutrality and active consensus in doctrines actually cultivated by hegemonic leadership. In fact, international legal regimes, such as 'universal' human rights, pursue cosmopolitan regulation at the expense of sovereign autonomy, emphasising the 'correctness' of democratic principles, rather than ensuring their consistent observance.
Hegemony is not a one-way process. Rather, international legal ideology gives rise to shared consciousness, subjecting all states to the control of a single, generalised system. It is an epistemological imperialism that assimilates all nation-states into one political cosmology. International law's very existence, as a juridical structure equally applicable to all states, disguises the inequality central to hegemonic function: its impels all to demonstrate that their political and economic decisions have a legalist justification, however strained it may be.53 And, alongside capitalist globalisation, it undermines political difference to perpetuate hegemonic leadership (note: by 'leadership' , I mean persuasive authority, not imposed domination or naked material power).54 For international law becomes inscribed into the very subjectivities (or, the unconscious impulses) that drive subordinates to obey globalising processes.
Reified labels of international law underscore its impartiality and procedural morality. But they neglect to register international law as a contingent, social structure suitable to hegemonic interests. International law cloaks oppressive socio-economic relations founded on capitalist logic, etched into subordinate existence, so that discontented rebellion is felt as selftransgression.55 International law's civilising force has been rendered customary by six centuries of European imperialist expansion (the U.S. itself is a post-colonial state). International law's ideological authority becomes tradition-bound, an automation, residing in senseless habitual and customary submission:
habit provides the strongest proofs and those that are most believed. It inclines the automation, which leads the mind unconsciously along with it … custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason that it is accepted. That is the mystic basis of its authority …56 (emphasis added) Political imperialism, enacted presently through internationalised capital relations, is itself embedded within sovereign equality. International law, a juridical regime of formal equality and material inequality, sees only select international institutions and politically relevant states involved in its adjudication and administration. Its social rules regulate commodity production and distribution in service of the capitalist world-system.57 The most basic issue is that Ideology materialises when the subject undertakes social activity not because of external obedience, but as an expression of its unconscious, inner belief. Hegemony succeeds when subordinates cease to recognise the order's arbitrariness. The order instead validates the subordinate's inherent desire for inclusion. Ruling ideology is 'anthropomorphic': it refers the subject back to itself, encouraging the subordinate to aspire to a reconstructed social life according to a 'universally legitimate' framework (the senso commune), coextensive with material inducements to their 'best interests' .61
Gramsci traces the organic development of hegemony through multifaceted, interclass relations. Hegemony, for Gramsci, constitutes the pinnacle of collective political consciousness. Recalibrating Machiavelli's Prince, Gramsci sketches three levels of ascending unification in social and economic formations.
(1) He begins with an intra-group interest: members of a professional group-linked via trade or craft-realise the homogeneity of, and the need to coordinate, their interests. (2) This evolves into an inter-group interest, generated from a 'solidarity of
[economic] interests among all members of a social class'62 but not outside the class. '63 A collective political will is then formed; the hegemonic class assumes the definitive role in society. Put differently, hegemony is established when the hegemonic class's package of economic, political, intellectual, and moral interests unifies society through an ideological intermediary. The hegemonic class manufactures common cultural policies, embedded into multifarious institutions including political parties, universities, 'the rule of law' , families, media platforms, and religious institutions ('social apparatuses'). Social apparatuses materialise a coherent ideology convenient to hegemonic interests for the entire social bloc's subscription.64 The ideology provides the yardstick by which the heterogeneous interests of subordinates are assessed; a unified benchmark for national action, marshalled by the hegemonic class.65
The bourgeoisie rallies the support of the proletariat in civil society. Hegemonic leadership, latently guaranteed by the coercion of adversarial classes, gradually coalesces into the expression of public opinion, or, the senso commune.66 This is the cathartic moment of hegemony. The social strata then process their lived experience through criterion established by the hegemonic class, without conscious intention: fused are their interests, on a universal plane.67
There is one important qualification, however. To bind and articulate the full spectrum of identities and maintain dominant relations of production, the hegemonic class must make concessions for the interests and beliefs of its followers. It ought to forfeit certain privileges and uphold a juridical equilibrium, satisfying the normative considerations of subordinate classes. This calls our attention to a preeminent component of Gramscian hegemony. A synthesised collective will requires compromise: the tendencies of subordinates linger in hegemonic strategy. To universalise a 'common interest' for international society, U.S. hegemony relinquishes sole pursuit of narrowly constituted corporate interests. It instead audits the social processes of subordinates to ensure that its ideological credibility finds allegiance. (I depart from Pashukanis, for whom juridical equality is a tool to mediate commodity exchange between self-interested owners, absent political intervention. This characterisation, left unqualified, risks denying the educative force of ideology, or, its finesse in normalising social structures and discouraging alternatives.)
Multilateral forums conceive international law. The diversity of political cleavages, ethnicity, language, religious attachments, inter alia, leave its substance contestable. But wanting is political equality in the contestation process: inequality between states's coercive capacities to exploit juridical relations renders the one state one vote system formalistic. Essential to their socialisation, subordinates expect the hegemonic class to drive economic development, assume leadership in interstate political activity, and anticipate subordinate interests when formulating policy. Established hierarchies of influence pervade negotiations; core states present appealing solutions to materially incentivise peripheries, before they abdicate responsibility for decision-making and fall into line.68 It is a liberating submission; responsibility is delegated to those charged with directing world affairs.
Legal formalism obscures the asymmetrical power relations which underline international law. Bereft of intrinsic rationality, international law is a contingent expression of constitutive political relationships, a medium on which the rules are decided, by coercion. It systematically distracts from hegemonic privilege: an endlessly precarious social unity, established at the imaginary level, subject to constant political struggle.69 I have intimated that there is, however, a subtler psychological validity embodied in state actions commensurate with international legal ideology. An ideological intermediary is the element in which both the hegemonic class and the subordinate come to apprehend the political, social, and cultural authority of neoliberalism. substantive inequality in interstate social and economic relations.71 But international law provides a platform to remedy injustice, mediate differences in sovereign egoism, and confer procedural guarantees to the dominated.72 The hegemonic class seeks to preserve social relations which cultivate its interests and limit contestation to social structures by casting alternatives to outside the bounds of imagination. But its ideology is not automatically internalised by a powerless subordinate, unconscious of its social reality. The subordinate gradually self-subordinates and rationalises that its complicity in perpetuating hegemonic leadership is sensible. Capitalism produces social apparatuses that organically demand a stabilising hegemonic power to regulate distribution of economic and cultural capital.
I partially agree with the liberal interpretation that international law constitutes a social power, alienated from dominant economic forces; a terrain to regulate competing interests between the hegemon and the subordinate.73 Positivists stress that international law emerges from consensus-based institutional practices; its existence is a matter of historical fact. But this view is exceedingly simplistic, and reduces the identification of law to one of neutral procedure. It defends international law as a universally accepted legal discourse, ignoring the coercive political relations that condition law's existence. 74 Miéville's thesis shatters the argument that international law is a discrete, impartial discipline. International legal ideology is, however, as much a reality of interstate organisation as the capitalistic market relations that it sustains. To take Žižek's expression: the capitalist frame itself is part of the framed content. A habitual behaviour socialised into the subordinate, international legal ideology projects social reality as dependent on the systemic stability that hegemony underwrites. A lived zeitgeist, it stamps the human need for self-assurance that material conditions are justified and unquestionable, even if one is constructively aware of the fractured inequality which defines one's social reality.76 It objectifies international law's juridical categories-rules, treaties, and custom-as a venerable phenomenon derived from consent, rather than a historically specific constituent of neoliberal political projects which achieve a worldwide convergence of subordinate expectations.
International legal ideology is a product of intellectual labour. Elite advocates disseminate utterances, images, and structures, concordant with the hegemonic public order, for the subordinate to subconsciously consume.77 It offers the subordinate a pleasing, legitimated authority, worthy of its 'voluntary' obedience.78 The subordinate internalises international legal norms to integrate into the hegemon's 'family of nations'-the international public order's caucus of politically 'legitimate' states.
Not merely functional to hegemony, China's political identity evidences the efficaciousness of international legal ideology. First, the CCP invests in the People's belief that their normative subordination is en route to being rectified; presenting deference to neoliberalism as a progressive step before China 75 Miéville (n 34) 291-293. Compare Miéville's thesis with Koskenniemi's argument for recognising political claims behind international law. Hegemony, itself contingent and particularistic, only fashions a reproducible version of its normative order for the subordinate: "behind every notion of universal international law there is always some particular view, expressed by some particular actor in some particular situation … However universal the terms in which international law is invoked, it never appears as an autonomous and stable set of demands over a political reality. realises its 'destined' social order. This establishes the difference between China's political lineage and those of oppositional regimes.79 A political union of 'we' demands the existence of a 'they' opposition: harmony can only be realised by division. Transatlantic overreactions to the Chinese Dream and China's 'appropriation' of Western structures (including law, economic relations, and culture), produce a political effect constitutive of the CCP's identity.80 International law affirms neoliberal structures that inculcate outcome-driven beliefs in Chinese foreign policy. China submits to the leadership, legitimacy, and authority of neoliberalism: effective tools of global governance in the absence of supranational coercion. The Chinese policy elite, while resenting Western slights to its historical narrative, reproduce the exploitative logic of neoliberalism, legitimated by international legal ideology, for expediency.
Ideology is unconsciously lived and perpetuated, through the subordinate's adoption of prevailing social structures of production. International legal ideology offers a real and inspirational version of social relations for the subordinate. It affirms a genuine lived belief that international law attempts to replicate ideals of justice, equality, and freedom in social reality. And, it forms a benchmark for the subordinate to forge its identity in relation to 'other' conditions of existence. The CCP's refute of eurocentrality unveils their obedience to an internal authority of belief: a subjective conviction that the hegemonic narrative presented is offensive to China's historical centrality.81 Every substantive move in Chinese foreign policy reacts to U.S. hegemonic ascendancy, the protagonist in the global architecture. International legal ideology is a formalised social structure for collective organisation, supplementary to capitalist relations and hegemonic politics. It is not simply manipulative consciousness.
China measures modern progress against its ancient history and considers its modernisation part of a recovery process that began with the Qing's collapse.82 Its domestic longevity is reified with narratives beginning from the Qin and Han dynasties, to the intermediate Tang Dynasty (the pinnacle of Chinese philosophy, poetry, and the arts), and the Ming Dynasty. But exploiting the capitalist world-economy is the way to realise the Chinese Dream. That belief has been actively taught to China since the Opium War. China's internal strife has assisted it to learn to bide its time, before a historical moment ripe for its regeneration eventuates. For the U.S., international law is permanently ready-made: its institutions materially induce the subordinate to translate a liberal system of world trade into domestic arenas. The U.S., however, also constructs its political complexion through the presence of China, its preeminent counterparty.83 Boundaries of social division craft an adversary, an outside unit, to define Chinese and U.S. identity, in opposition.84 When Western professional intellectuals remind their Anglophone audience that China's 'authoritarian' regime flouts international law, implicit in the broadcast is that 'our' democratic system personifies political legitimacy. When CCP funded academies posit that international law is an institutional disguise for Western imperialism, they intimate that the constitution of the Chinese party-state personifies political legitimacy. Immanent within both positions is that the other's ideology is partly constitutive of its own regime: conjoined are the two, metaphysically.
Sino-U.S. relations typify the function of international legal ideology. International legal ideology offers a recognisable set of normative justifications to support neoliberal relations of production, materially constituting the subordinate's social practices. It distorts the present epoch as ahistorical, unalterable, and progressive towards a political utopia. It fails to recognise neoliberalism as a conditional product of historically and socially specific practices. But international law serves as a credible expression of political arrangements, as the persuasive influence that takes hold in the subordinate after the initial moment of civilising force. 85 International legal ideology is an amorphous, uneven formation. It determines the social objectivity of both rulers and subjects: the identity of each class is inherent in its opposite.86 In advancing its prerogatives, the hegemonic class has already excluded conceptions incompatible with its leadership. It then negotiates with the subordinate to form a senso commune. International politics is rooted in recurrent ideological struggle, appropriation, and transformation. The political identity of hegemonic leadership can only be constructed through the presence of non-hegemonic states and subordinates. Rendering interstate relations intelligible, international legal ideology cements capitalist logic in the hegemon and subordinate alike. Emancipatory Potential: Intellectual and Moral Reform International legal ideology inverts material inequality and exploitation into formal equality and consent. But does it have emancipatory potential? Hegemonic alternatives always exist, internally within the senso commune, which aggregates disparate conceptions, and externally in the subordinate's fluctuating allegiance to hegemony. International legal ideology is a relational, rather than a self-referential, phenomenon: it must be continuously renewed, redefended, and modified as hegemony's trusty accompaniment.87 Otherwise, the proletariat may: (1) increasingly develop self-awareness of its autonomy vis-à-vis the hegemonic class; (2) disarticulate the ideology characteristic of the prevailing social formation; and (3) cement its own senso commune to represent the interests of social groups disgruntled with the present hegemony. The hegemonic class's negotiation with the subordinate reveals that international legal ideology is internally heterogeneous: its self-identity is continually reconstituted and exists in relation to the subordinate's consciousness.88 An internalised, but open-ended social system, international legal ideology lives in the subordinate's response; its existence presupposes ceaseless innovation, not static formula.89 The CCP partly lives its political experience by adapting the blueprints of neoliberalism for its own advantage.90 But no natural boundary distinguishes the Beijing cosmology from neoliberalism; the two not only compete and coexist, they affect and contaminate one another.91
Ruling ideology never completely mystifies the subordinate. Always implicit is a conceptual distance between hegemony and the subordinate's particularised existence. U.S. hegemonic neoliberalism will be replicated differently in each secondary state.92 This internal contradiction means that hegemonic change is permanently possible: alternatives reside as a disruptive element within the hegemonic ideology itself. The subordinate may awaken to challenge the hegemonic class's rule, when they no longer have confidence in the dominant ideology, constituted by compromises and divisive interests. There is no single principle to constitute the whole field of differences in society. Hegemony features, inevitably, the particularised conditions of one state and While emancipation is endlessly possible, China has no interest in overturning neoliberalism. If we interpret Chinese emancipation to be its transformation into a core production zone, international law is indispensable. If Sino-centrality is conversely the endgame, the present international legal ideology runs contrary to China's interests. It does not confer normative authority to a rising power that largely conforms to the global political economy. China would need to weaken the prevailing social logic of the U.S., of which international legal ideology forms a crucial part.94 It would expose the inequalities on which the ruling ideology predicates and emphasise internal points of strain to increase its peripheries's critical distance towards U.S. hegemony.95 First, China would need to free itself from itself: social apparatuses that shape everyday consciousness have proliferated Western prestige, and captured the allegiance of China's civil society. Obsession with U.S. education, military power, sports, wealth, corporations, products, fashion, music, and most importantly, its market economy, has diffused U.S. mass consumption into the texture of China's self-identity. The People validate social practice, in part, by the criteria of neoliberalism; the U.S. has demarcated the 'appropriate' boundaries of the People's social reality. This nonviolent social control yields conduct and standards that correspond with hegemony's intellectual governance. It is not in China's political interests to liberate itself; China's manoeuvers normalise capitalist architecture and reflect enthusiastic appropriation of core production status.96 Memories of attempted revolutionary breaks from neoliberalism weigh on the living elite, avoiding the potential for history to be repeated.97 Suspicions of Western motives besides, China, in character, participates in the agreed, symbolic space of ideological conflict that is international law.
Political conflict is a constitutive element of international law. A cosmopolitan covenant can never be truly universal because political consensus 93 Laclau and Mouffe (n 7) 88, 111. "Suture"-surgical nomenclature-refers to a healed wound that leaves a scar, marking difference, or the absence of a former identity. 
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The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) 81-121 is illusory. Interstate relations are the product of power asymmetry. Every order, including international law, 'is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities' .98 International legal ideology operates precisely to eternalise historically specific, social and political arrangements as predetermined and self-evident, defining alternative possibilities as 'unlawful' . Neither autonomous nor fixed, international legal ideology is parasitic: an intersubjectivity, constituted by the response of 'others' and endless power negotiation. Hegemony itself is fissured: it internalises ever-changing subordinate interests and adjusts social formations to ensure its continuous reproducibility. Together, the hegemon and subordinate set the limits of social imagination.99 Condemned to perpetual conflict, hegemonic adversaries engage in constant ideological warfare. They compete to define arbitrary social and political structures as the objective common interest.
Gramsci perceives emancipation to be intellectual and 'moral' reform, through which a social class diffuses its interests throughout society. This is a cultural battle to displace a present hegemonic class, often waged by a provisional alliance of secondary states-a heterodoxy-which attempts to weld together heterogeneous aims and formulate a new, orthodox, culturalsocial unity.100 A coalition of states may become enriched with spiritual, technical, and economic resources that allow them to deviate from the habits, customs, and social practices naturalised as unquestionable fact. Rearticulating existing ideological elements could challenge the hegemonic class's credibility. Hypothetically, China could engage in a disarticulation-rearticulation struggle with the U.S. to appropriate the hegemonic principle. That is, the ability to aggregate and pronounce a senso commune on behalf of hegemonic and secondary states.101 In doing so, China might repudiate the present construction of sovereign equality and institute a Confucian interpretation, specific to its social practices. This would strip existing international legal ideology into its constitutive principles, taking compatible elements to express an alternative possibility for interstate relations.102
Hegemonic contest transpires as an ideological war of position. Successful conquest of a preponderant ideological structure simply rearticulates the existing worldview. The determinative factor in contestation is the prospective hegemon's capacity to sublimate its personal standard into the subjectivity of all. Some contestants have greater capacity to universalise preferences by socialising subordinates, allowing them to confer or withdraw secondary states's legitimacy.103 A new hegemon unifies a collective will and adjust social and economic forces to amalgamate subordinate interests. The hegemon, armed previously with military and economic might, and now, intellectual unification, can express their will under the guise of legal doctrines, such as the responsibility to protect (legalised intervention), self-defence, and aggression.104 Axiomatic is that any interpretation taken under international law would relegate social classes to silence.
Ideology can only guarantee emancipation to the extent that alternatives are always possible. To depart from the hypothetical, China's foreign policy is, in practice, a normal continuation of the economic dimension of neoliberalism. China is disinterested, within the present epoch, in capturing its periphery's dissatisfaction with neoliberalism, especially given that it perceives its internal constitution to be unexportable. It has no desire to psychologically fashion a renewed conception of international law, a structure that China views as a Western-designed encumbrance. Fractions of its periphery-especially those with the greatest political and economic influence-harbour strategic distrust towards its dynastic autocracy, increasing the difficulty for China to attract support for the Beijing cosmology.
Presently, China attempts to intermesh the material interests of its periphery with the future of regional affairs under China's economic leadership. But to seize the emancipatory force of ideology and capture the subordinates's allegiance, China ought to engage in an ideological struggle with U.S. hegemony and supplant the present senso commune. China must continue to raise a Sino-centric consciousness in the subordinate to reduce the conceptual distance that separates the Beijing cosmology from preponderant neoliberalism. The emancipatory potential of international legal ideology remains, for China, unrealised.
In Section 2, I have examined the broader theoretical challenges to China's implementing a normative regional order. The hegemon-subordinate hierarchy remains embedded within international legal ideology; Beijing cannot gain ascendancy in the international public order merely by transforming itself into a core production zone. But as Section 3 shall demonstrate, China may succeed in using international law to its economic advantage.
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The Chinese Dream and International Law
3.1
The Chinese Dream's Socio-Political Background China-through the party-state's official pronouncements-has contrived a Confucian variant of neoliberalism, coloured by its history of scattered social organisation and its calamitous encounter with European capitalism. China's socio-historical background is unlike any other nation-state: modern China is a party-state, constituted by the CCP's unification of provincial, and multiracial, factions. Since the late 19th century, China's policy elite have been doubtful of Chinese cultural superiority, historically accepted as normative fact within the scholar-bureaucrat class. Alongside a perceived need to internalise Western ideas and technology,105 this doubt has informed China's drive both to enter modernity and restore its central position as the Middle Kingdom. 106 China's sovereign hypersensitivity today is no coincidence. The collapse of the Qing dynasty saw China capitulate under imperialism: it ceded Outer Manchuria, Hong Kong, and Macau, and was coerced into extraterritorial jurisdiction and imperial tariffs.107 Presently, Beijing still straddles both separatist uprisings from cultural minorities within and encirclement by imperialist powers without.
To fortify existing political boundaries, Chinese modernity (the Chinese Dream) is premised on establishing the regional centrality of its dynastic autocracy and exporting benevolent governance-not by direct intervention. 108 The Chinese Dream's overarching objective of recreating the heights that China scaled for two millennia is embodied in two projects championed by Xi:109 (1) a moderately prosperous Chinese society by 2021 (the CCP's centenary); and (2) the Chinese nation's revival by 2049 (the PRC's centenary). The Chinese Dream continues four-decades of domestic restructuring to support capitalist globalisation. Socialist economic planning has been repealed, replaced by mass privatisation, liberalised global trade, and mechanised industry. These policies concretise the capitalist market constitutive of international legal relations.110 But the CCP has not forsaken domestic protectionismespecially in politico-cultural policies.
China is unlike all Westphalian sovereign states, in terms of both its modern structure and its socio-cultural history. Modern China is a densely populated, multiethnic, cultural-Civilisational community. Merging distinctive tribes, languages, and customs in a Confucian common bond, China's makeup is incomparable to a culturally continuous Westphalian state with a smaller landmass and homogenous national identity.111 The stability of China's political structure, rooted in rural solidarity, empirically shatters the position that Rousseau's democratic social contract, a monument of the European Enlightenment, personifies the universally legitimate political framework. Rousseau envisaged that the citizenry renounce individual differences and collectively participate in civil society under a single government. This engenders political and 'moral' obedience to the will of a unified people, manifest in representative governance and law enforcement.112
In contrast, Sino-civilisation has always venerated the territorial autonomy of isolated agrarian communities. Subsistence farming directly connects livelihood with agrarian land, and sees minimal movement of people, competence, and capital. Beginning from the Qin unification of 221 BC, the ruling Empire's bureaucracy could not regulate social outcomes outside of the imperial core. Thus, no centrally administered 'law' existed. Powers were forfeited and duties assumed on a hierarchical basis. For example, the community chief would typically be expected to scale mountainous terrain for medical assistance if any of her constituency fell ill. Communities were also self-sufficient and reliant on each member to pursue collective interests-for example, by garrisoning wheat supplies from nearby pockets of agrarian existence. This mutually acknowledged arrangement constructed authoritative procedures for conflict resolution and economic management, adapted to a community's peculiarities.113 Confucian hierarchies (centralised imperial power → local gentry → agrarian communities), while not coercively enforced, subsumed all into a Confucian order. The imperial ruler would rewrite history for political purposes and determine the rank of different peoples. China's imperial government employed Confucian kinship as its authoritarian political order. Mao transposed agrarian isolationism to the party-state level during the late-1950s to the mid-1970s. The present CCP elite suffered through Chinese society's extreme self-centredness during the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' .114 The resulting isolation, internationally, and the anarchy caused, domestically, animate the Chinese elite's rejection of inward looking economic policy today.115 Thus, paradoxical to Sino-civilisation's disaggregated power structure, the People presently demand that the central polity transnationalise China's capital and resources. While China's internal power structure is transitioning to a party-state identity, the CCP has devised a sui generis concept to encompass vast cultural, ethnic, and geographical divergences. An imaginary unity, ethnicism, stretches 'the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire' .116 Transcending juristic citizenship, ethnicism formulates a cultural citizenry that links the sixty million members of the Chinese diaspora to their ancestral homeland. Designed to dilute the threat of multiracial separatism to China's social cohesion, this political unity discounts ethnic divisions and represses social conflict. The CCP celebrates ethnicism, predicated on Confucianism, as the enduring political lifeblood from which the Chinese state flows. Filial principles of Confucianism engender social camaraderie, linking the Chinese People's ('the People') interests with the policy elite's rejuvenation of the Chinese empire.118 The CCP sets contemporary progress in the context of regrettable history, legitimating China's achievements under its meritocratic governance. Importantly, ethnicism develops a habit of 'backward looking reification' in the People.119 The CCP deploys ethnicism to retrieve China's archaic hegemonic authority in East Asia, mobilising the People's commitment to the Chinese Dream: the unification of both domestic and periphery into a Confucian normative order.
The CCP's organisational structure permeates Chinese society: central political decisions elicit concerted action from provincial and local governments.120 Like all policy elites, the CCP constitutes the People's interests: it prevents external interference, bestows citizenship, and allocates resources to maximise living standards.121 But the narrative of China's longevity directly informs the People's present view of the party-state's legitimacy. Outlasting cyclical chaos and torturous uprisings, the CCP then fulfils their Confucian mandate to exclusively implement policies that improve the People's welfare. The Party's political leadership is all-encompassing: nothing, not even corporate capitalism, overrides the CCP.122
The Chinese Dream draws upon the unique socio-historical structures that bound a scattered, but formally unified China from the Qin dynasty onwards. I also undertake my following two-tiered analysis of OBOR in the context of China's socio-political particularities. First, OBOR's 'win-win' investments enrich capitalist production; they do not herald hegemonic transition from to the West's industrial revolution, but the power disparity would now be rectified. CCP-backed chain of commodity production across political boundaries, with a thematic overlay of 'regional win-win' .129
OBOR offers a Confucian variant of neoliberalism. Eschewing conquest, hegemony, and zero-sum struggle,130 China instead narrativises harmonious regional integration as historically proven, (temporarily) overshadowing interstate heterogeneity. States and their relationships are imagined communities formulated by the stories we tell about them.131 OBOR supposedly retrieves the 'spirit' immanent within the ancient Silk Road: 'mutual trust, reciprocity, and shared destiny' ('OBOR model'),132 while remaining aloof from universalist beliefs in neoliberalism.133 Alienation and objectification of all formal relations are conflated with collective filial ties, reified through a backwards looking process to China's Civilisational centrality.
Predictions that Sino-centric interdependence will precipitate the demise of U.S. leadership mistake a continuation of capitalism for a radical break.134 China engages in the existing framework of international law to implement China's economic transformation is realised through the existing framework of neoliberalism, indirectly affirming the present normative world system.
3.2.2
A Confucian Variant of Neoliberalism OBOR's multifarious aims accord with Confucian structures. OBOR contains two constitutive elements: (1) a continuation of economic neoliberalism, led by U.S. hegemony (elaborated in the previous subsection); and (2) a Confucian narrative of China's evolution from a peripheral node to a core production zone.
China became the peripheral producer, par excellence: it committed to marketisation, liberalised trade, and economic interdependence. Chinese domestic markets welcomed foreign capital, and China's population undertook peripheral production, securing consistent surplus value output for foreign capitalists. In consequence, internationalised capitalist production instituted the economic leadership and cultural eminency of generalised neoliberalism in China.141
Correlative to its economic subordination, China conceded to the U.S.'s political direction of international affairs post-WWII. China's policies internalised capitalist concerns, deferring to neoliberal control of markets, capital, and raw materials.142 Liberal mythology-constructed through private international regimes-isolates commercial relations from state authority. Western private authority controls mass media,143 maritime transport, arbitral dispute settlement, the minerals industry, the internet, capital markets, and transnational financial regulations.144 Political shifts towards capitalist economics depended on U.S. hegemony: specifically, its material and cultural leadership.145 China now seeks to deploy its increased political and economic capacity to evolve beyond peripheral status in internationalised capitalist production. OBOR's strategy is rooted in Confucian theory. First, the OBOR model resonates distinctively with China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.146 These principles interpret sovereign equality as an obligation to 'live and let live' , anchoring China's stance on international law. The Principles affirm Confucian coexistence between equal subjects, absent a superordinate authority. As subsection 3.2.3 demonstrates, China wishes to deploy international legal structures to impose its economic and social logic in its periphery.
Second, OBOR characterises China's peripheral relations in terms of Confucian kinship, to present Chinese centrality as historically predetermined. The CCP, as the central polity, retains absolute sovereign power only in China, but administers ruling policy through sovereign peripheral governments (tantamount to a localised gentry). China's putatively harmonious order allows a family of nations to coexist by incorporating peripheral states, while upholding each state's self-government.147 OBOR is an extended version of the Confucian kinship that bound China's scattered agrarian communities, articulated in subsection 3.1.
The Confucian kinship model of political relations is not founded on a division of labour in production, but on China's paternalistic view of its periphery.148 A central apparatus, legitimated through virtuous rule, allies with the local gentry to administer policies throughout sparse territories. The gentry tailors central policy to the specific needs of particular provincial groups, each with disparate customs, traditions, privileges, and belief systems. These groups, collectively, constitute the principals of the body politic and determine the statesmen's social legitimacy. A duty to inspire the public spirit of its People inheres in the central polity's mandate of meritorious governance.149 The Confucian kinship model characterises China domestically, and now, its vision for regional Sino-centrality.
Chinese 'modernity' deliberately recognises two seemingly incongruous forces: market centrality, on one side, and the revival of tribalistic identitypolitics, on the other. In the West, capitalist globalisation has realigned basic Liu The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) 81-121 functional to neoliberal hegemony. 155 Political relations between abstract sovereign equals are social relations of exchange, which contain coercive violence immanently. 156 International law converts social relations of production into a formal legal relationship. In the modern context of global capitalism, unequal political struggles between states-the juridical form of the international system-actualise the content of international law.157 International legal relations represent the imperialist triumph of one state agent, over another, with capitalist logic as its constant backdrop. 158 International law expedites China's proliferation of socio-economic relations subservient to its core processes. Capitalist relations between juridically equal sovereigns, abstracted of social context, sees the distinction between political and legal wither away.159 China's political decisions bring about economic division in the region, executed through capitalist rules governing commodity exchange and wage-labour exploitation. 160 When participating in (formally equal) politico-economic relations, states have unequal access to the means of coercion. Regulatory violence is exerted by (or implicit within) states themselves as juridical subjects, upholding the 'legality' of these interactions. China's bargaining power over recipients determines the content of OBOR's treaties and contracts.161 Political and economic might translates into an internationally 'legal' exploitation of resources to generate capital. China's peripheries, as mere objects of OBOR policy, can only passively resist or concede: the discrepancy in coercive violence sees China determining the particular content of their (formally equal) legal relationship.162 OBOR amplifies the People's private managerial control of economic sectors in recipient states, employing rules of financial governance to decentralise political authority from state bureaucracies.163 Despite political differences, China has committed Liu The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 4 (2018) 81-121 the innovation of the Beijing cosmology.186 A majority of the world's policy mainstream either subscribe to, or are drawn from, layers within the Western establishment. Socialised to accept the hegemon's normative order, they diffuse the ruling philosophy in social life and secure a united criterion for popular mentality.187 The West, accordingly, controls the dominant intellectual power to articulate the 'acceptable' criteria around which social orders are constructed. It is not 'acceptable' , within neoliberal hegemony, for China to trespass onto the territory of ideological leadership.
International law is the medium by which the rules are decided, not the rules themselves. China employs international law to formalise OBOR's projects and decide the rules of engagement with its peripheries. International law coherently organises relations of production to mediate political-capitalist objectives.188 China packages these relations in a Confucian narrative to facilitate OBOR.
Conclusions and Ideological Horizons
China and international law make a curious pair. The Middle Kingdom's secluded governance created a fertile soil for the world's oldest continuing civilisation, with unbroken lineages in the arts, literature, and philosophythe basis of an ongoing narrative of self-assured cultural superiority. Since the Qin's imperial ascendancy, China has largely maintained the character of its dynastic autocracy, defined by cyclical, imperial vicissitudes. On the other side, international law's complexion reflects the extent to which Western powers have, in Marx's words, stitched up the whole world into an all-encompassing system of neoliberalism. For the CCP, troubling is international law's universalising practice, which disguises demonstrable inequality with abstract equality and liberalist self-rule: ideals rooted in Enlightenment Europe. Chinese statism, in consequence, structurally confines Western democracy to the theoretical, domestically, but yields to market forces, externally. This is the policy around which all CCP initiatives revolve. The present study has put the argument that these different political regimes are bound in an interrelationship by the capitalist world-economy. The CCP's insistence on the Chinese Dream does not forsake neoliberalism. Rather, it
